In contrast to the focus of much of the literature on the role of capital markets in hastening convergence in corporate governance practices worldwide, we document the role played by the globalization of product and talent markets in affecting corporate governance of firms in the Indian software industry. We discuss several possible reasons why a particular firm, Infosys, has emerged as the exemplar of good corporate governance in India, traditionally a backwater of corporate governance practices. We further analyze the manner in which Infosys has attempted to shape corporate governance practices in India more generally. Finally, we discuss why these efforts in particular, and globalization more generally, has not had much of an effect on corporate governance convergence in the aggregate in India, thus far.
I. Introduction
We document the under-studied effect that global product and labor markets can play in the convergence of corporate governance systems worldwide. This complements our understanding of the much more extensively-studied role of capital markets in fostering such convergence through, for example, cross-border listings and global institutional investor activism.
The software industry offers a unique setting to test the role of global product and labor markets for two reasons. First, for a large part of the industry, there is a global market for technical talent. Second, capital plays a smaller role in software than in most other global industries. Thus, one can, to some extent, isolate the impact of global talent markets from the effect of global capital markets, though, admittedly, it is harder to disentangle the effects of global talent from global product markets.
Further, the emergence of the Indian software industry offers a unique experimental setting to ask whether globalization can promote convergence in corporate governance. This is because India is home to a globally competitive set of software powerhouses and because India is generally very far from world standards in what constitutes good corporate governance. The success and generally positive reputation of India's software firms -in contrast to most of India's other firms -provides at least surface credence to the idea that the global markets to which these firms are exposed has affected their governance systems. This is the proposition that we explore in depth through a case study of the Indian software industry, and of one of India's leading software companies, Infosys. The popular press frequently cites Infosys as a model for sound corporate governance in India and, indeed, in Asia. 1 In our research, we ask why it is that Infosys developed a reputation for being committed to shareholder value creation in a country, India, where corporate governance has, historically, not been a first-order concern. We also attempt to document the extent to which the corporate governance practices of Infosys are to be found in other Indian software firms and among Indian firms more generally.
Our interviews with the top management of Infosys, and related field research in India, suggest that exposure to global capital markets is a result, rather than a cause, of Infosys' decision to adopt world corporate governance standards. The proximate cause of the aspiration to good corporate governance at Infosys, in turn, is its need to attract talent with truly worldwide options, which in turn is necessitated by fierce global product market competition.
Part of our narration of the Infosys corporate governance case study is a description of the efforts on the part of its management to help institutionalize good corporate governance in India. Indeed, diffusion of corporate governance practices in India is rendered partly feasible by a coalition between firms and regulators that serves to educate regulators and provides a blueprint for engineering a transition from a stakeholder to a shareholder-based corporate governance system. Ultimately, however, the corporate governance standards at Infosys are the exception rather than the norm in India. Some data on corporate governance in India suggest that most firms fall far short of the Infosys benchmark, including most firms within the software industry. Further, our companion large-sample econometric analysis suggests that there is very little evidence that globalization of any form is correlated with adoption of U.S. style corporate governance around the world (Khanna, Kogan and Palepu, 2001) . We therefore dedicate the last part of the paper to exploring why the effect of globalization on corporate governance convergence might be limited.
The case study is based on interviews and field research at Infosys in early 2001, and with several dozen field interviews with competitors and regulators over the past three years. In the remainder of the paper, we first briefly summarize the state-of-the-art literature on convergence of corporate governance. We then provide, in the following two sections, brief overviews of the Indian software industry and of the state of corporate governance in India in the 1990s. The subsequent two long sections constitute the analytical heart of the paper. We first consider three, non-mutually exclusive reasons for Infosys' adoption of corporate governance practices. As part of this section, we develop a model to demonstrate the interaction between Infosys, its competitors and the regulator in the corporate governance adoption process. The next section considers why the spillovers of Infosys' corporate governance practices to other firms have ultimately been limited, and why globalization has not hastened corporate governance convergence in the aggregate. A final section presents our conclusions.
II. Theoretical perspectives on convergence in corporate governance
The idea of convergence in 'form', or literal convergence, postulates that efficiency considerations and, implicitly, some form of global competition, will dictate that all nations will ultimately adopt the same corporate governance system. This view is most forcefully expressed by Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) in their paper entitled 'The end of history for corporate law.' They, and numerous earlier proponents of this view (see, for example, Karmel 1991) , point to the current consensus that the anointed system towards which convergence in form will occur is that of the U.S. Skeptics aver, however, that it is plausible that countries' systems can fall from grace -witness the favor in which Japan was held in the 1980s and early 1990s and its current disfavorsuggesting that the current consensus will be short-lived. Further, there have been several theoretical arguments for pros and cons of different systems. Failure to agree on the end-state of convergence, in turn, calls into question the idea of convergence in form.
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A less extreme perspective rests on the idea that there is sufficient plasticity in each country's institutions so that the key function of corporate governance -the 2 Bhidé (1993) points out that there are pros and cons to a financial system with dispersed shareholdings. Such a system encourages an active external market for corporate control, and thus can foster good governance. On the other hand, the lack of a large block shareholder who can internalize the externalities inherent in providing monitoring services also means that shareholders will not actively engage in internal monitoring, but will choose to vote with their feet. Thus there are tradeoffs inherent in different systems of corporate governance.
protection of resource providers -can be largely achieved within the constraints of the country's institutions. This perspective is referred to as 'functional convergence' by Gilson (2000) . 3 The idea of functional convergence per se has a long pedigree in social science (Merton, 1968) , and has recently been applied to financial systems more generally (Crane et al., 1995) .
At the other extreme from the convergence in form perspective is one that forcefully claims that path dependence has led different economies to very different corporate governance systems, and that these are not easily dislodged, not even by global competition (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) . One reason why even functional convergence might not obtain is that there remains considerable disagreement about the functions of corporate governance. Specifically, should corporate governance systems primarily protect providers of capital, or also cater to other stakeholders in the firm, notably labor (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001 )?
Whether convergence occurs in form or function, some form of global competition is implicitly assumed to be the proximate cause. Perhaps most emphasized is the idea that global institutional investors, largely originating from the U.S., will flex their muscle and compel firms that demand their funds to adopt corporate governance standards with which they are familiar. 4 Also often emphasized is the idea of a sorting of a country's firms, with the higher quality ones listing in centers of global capital (most commonly, New York and London) and the lower quality ones remaining in the home country, with resultant pressure on the local capital markets to upgrade (Coffee, 1999) . 5 3 Kaplan (1994) has provided some econometric evidence of this for a particular aspect of corporate governance. Statistically, poorly performing CEOs appear equally likely to be dismissed in the U.S., Germany and Japan, despite the very different formal systems in place. 4 As an example, Tiger Fund forced SK Ttelecom, a Korean firm belonging to the SK Group (chaebol) of companies, to abandon shareholder unfriendly practices. 5 Israel provides an example of such a sorting mechanism (Blass and Yafeh, 2001) . The burgeoning number of global capital issues also suggests the importance of this issue (Karolyi, 1998) . Of course, the flight of high quality issuers might have the opposite effect of causing a degeneration, or hollowing-out, of the local capital market. Such concerns have been expressed, for instance, in South Africa recently, as well as in Mexico (Moel, 1999) .
The consensus view on the causes of convergence assigns considerably less importance to global product market competition forcing convergence, and none at all to global talent market competition forcing convergence.
III. The Indian software industry
In this section, we focus on the role that the Indian software industry plays within the global software industry. The discussion is necessarily limited. The section draws on a variety of sources, including Ghemawat, Patilbandla, and Coughlin (1999), Heeks (1996) , and Kapur and Ramamurti (2001) . Fuller accounts of the software industry may also be found in these works. As an organizing device, we first describe the supply and demand sides of the Indian software industry, and then describe industry features that illuminate the industry equilibrium. Approximately 70% of the cost structure of a software company is accounted for by personnel related costs. India's initial entrée into the software business has to do with its access to cheap talent. India produces more engineers and scientists than every country in the world other than the U.S. The key feature of the talent is that it is much more globally mobile than labor in general. Indians (especially programmers), in particular, account for more than 40% of the H1B visas (temporary work visas) issued by the U.S. to foreign talent. Further, the Indian diaspora, long-established successfully in the U.S., has played a key role in facilitating the flow of talent back-and-forth between India and the U.S. (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2001 ).
Indian firms compete vigorously in the global product market. Firms from countries like Russia, Ireland and the Philippines are prominently cited as direct competitors, for example. Software firms from advanced economies like the U.S. are also indirect competitors, in that clients may choose between generally more sophisticated services from these expensive advanced-economy firms and the less sophisticated but cheaper services from emerging economies.
What role has the government played in facilitating the operations of Indian firms? Heeks (1996) points out that there have been fits and starts in the liberalization process pre-1991. Since 1991, the government has largely stayed out of the way and allowed the software industry to compete in an unfettered way. As Zaheer and Rajan (2001) point out, the last two areas to be deregulated were internet access in1998 and international bandwidth provision in 1999. The party currently in power (as a leader of a coalition), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was the first to explicitly support the software industry in its election manifesto. An interesting feature is that most of India's state governments have explicit information technology promotion policies and compete to attract firms to their states. The formation of the industry lobbying group, NASSCOMM, provides an efficient means for dialogue between the private sector and the various state and central governments.
Demand side
Three types of demand for software services existed that were relevant to India.
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At the low end was the demand by foreign firms for on-site services, also referred to in a derogatory sense as 'bodyshopping.' This practice involved Indian programmers relocating to the host country, typically for a short period of time and for significantly lower wages than local programmers in the host country. Clients generally received the services of the programmer 'bodies' with much less by way of organizational knowledge 6 Indian industry has generally played only a very small role in other large parts of the global software industry, such as packaged software. We eschew discussion of these parts of the industry for brevity. Also, we focus on export markets, rather than on the domestic Indian software market, since our interest is in global competition in this paper. from the software firms. One reason why many Indian software companies started this way had to do with their lack of access to appropriate hardware in India, in turn caused by regulatory (typically foreign exchange) restrictions.
The other type of demand was by foreign, primarily U.S. companies, for Offshore Development Centers. These were physical locations in India that companies dedicated to the needs of a particular advanced-economy multinational, where teams of Indian programmers and some personnel from the foreign company worked together for long time periods and with more intensive knowledge exchange. The third type of demand was a mixture between bodyshopping and the offshore development centers. Given the cheap talent and the initial absence of reputation, Indian firms started out at the low end providing primarily bodyshopping services. They gradually built reputations for reliability and high quality of services and began to provide more valueadded services (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000) . By 1999-2000, offshore services, the more value-added part of the Indian software firms' offerings, had risen to 58% of export revenues from 5% in 1991-92. Five of the nine software development centers in the world with CMM Level 5 ratings, the highest ratings on the predominant quality scale developed for software at Carnegie-Mellon University, were located in India. Companies like General Electric, Citicorp and IBM had their only CMM-certified operations in India rather than in the U.S.
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The upgrading of the Indian software industry was expected to continue. Expected revenues by 2008 were set in the neighborhood of $87 bn by a NASSCOMM-McKinsey study, as long as government continued to remove bottlenecks for the development of the software sector. Talent now increasingly captured a piece of the software pie, partly as a result of global pressure on domestic wages. A Jardine Fleming study suggested that the costs of an Indian programmer had risen to as much as $3,000/month (though this was still 1/3 of the costs of a U.S. programmer).
It is worth emphasizing that the Indian software industry was exposed to global product and global labor markets before raising capital overseas ever became an issue.
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IV. The standards of corporate governance in India 9
As late as the early 1990s, corporate governance was not a well-understood concept in India. Indeed, until 1991, the objective of government policy was to maximize loans to the industrial sector in the belief that this would lead to industrial development and employment creation. Monitoring of the loans was not a major priority. The major financial institutions, which were government owned and controlled, were often instructed not to disturb management, and to side with them in the event of any dispute; they virtually never divested their ownership stake in any firm. Second, financial institutions were never provided with any incentives to monitor. Pouring more money after a bad loan, in the hope that the distressed firm would find its way out of trouble, was 7 It may be that quality concerns are greater when a firm is located in an environment with a reputation for poor governance and poor quality products. Perhaps U.S. firms do not find it necessary to seek certification of this sort.
consistent with the objective of maximizing loans. Attempting to shut down distressed firms was prohibitively costly. Third, competition among financial intermediaries was non-existent for several reasons. Regulations had eliminated the possibility of most bases of competition. The Indian Banks Association (IBA) functioned as a de facto cartel, fixing wages, prices, and service conditions. Firms granted a license under the pre-1991 'license raj' more or less were guaranteed financial support from state-run financial institutions. Finally, intermediaries, most of whom were government-owned, were not monitored themselves. As of 2001, corporate governance scandals were discussed almost routinely in the Indian business media. Parekh scandal, named after the protagonist broker, involves banks lending money to unscrupulous entrepreneurs to invest in, and thereby exacerbate, India's information technology-led stock market bubble, with ultimately disastrous consequences. The second has to do with the failure of the Unit Trust of India, the state-run mutual fund in which tens of millions of Indians have their life-savings invested, and its unprecedented 'repurchase freeze' which prevents savers from redeeming their savings. The Ministry of Finance has endured heavy criticism for its inept handling of the UTI affair, especially since problems at the fund were apparent and discussed in the country's Parliament and in the media in 1994 and 1998. The situation is perhaps best summarized by the scathing critique issued by ex-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, the architect of India's 1991 reforms, "First and foremost, we need to improve the quality of governance in this country. Making a mockery of the system, not enforcing the law, letting respective state governments play havoc with law and order, having non-uniformity in implementation of law depending on the status of the persons involved and letting loose an era of extortions either through direct ransom or historically privileged access to funds. The resulting need to access public capital markets made them more conscious of the bad loans on their balance sheets. Deregulation of interest rates and the gradual elimination of consortium requirements increased competition among the financial institutions. Private sector mutual funds were allowed to compete with the state monopoly. (c) A takeover code was introduced in late 1994, after a public outcry over legally sanctioned price rigging. 
Governance in the Indian software industry
The same CLSA data, however, also point out that the corporate governance ratings of the software firms are higher than those of other Indian firms. The mean ratings for software firms (of which there are eight in the CLSA data) and for non-software firms (of which there are 72) are, respectively, 64.3 and 54.7 (minimum of 0 and maximum of 100), with the difference statistically significantly with a p-value of 0.02. The medians are, similarly, 62.9 and 53.8, with the difference statistically significant with a p-value of 0.2.
The data also confirm that software firms are, on average, more exposed to global competition than other Indian firms. To ratify this assertion, we supplemented CLSA data with a variety of indicators of global competition. Software firms are more likely to be traded on a U.S. stock exchange (p value 0.02) and on the London Stock Exchange (pvalue 0.08) and more likely to be listed on the NYSE (p value 0.01). Software firms garner a higher percentage of their revenues through exports (p value 0.01), are more likely to employ foreign talent in senior managerial positions (p value 0.01) and are somewhat more likely to employ a Big 5 accounting firm (p value 0.12).
13 13 However there is no statistically significant difference between software and non-software firms in the proportion of equity held by institutional investors.
V. Corporate governance at Infosys
We describe corporate governance at one of India's leading software companies, Infosys, the one most credited with adopting good corporate governance practices. A subsequent section considers reasons why Infosys adopted the practices that it did and the effects of this adoption on other firms in the software industry and in India more generally. practices.) Infosys prided itself on several 'firsts' in the Indian context, disclosing these in its annual reports (Kuemmerle & Coughlin, 2000) . Interestingly, eight of the twelve such firsts had to do with adopting corporate governance practices far beyond those mandated by Indian corporate governance standards.
Financial Reporting and Disclosure
Infosys was the first Indian company to follow US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), to value human resources and vountarily dislcose such a valuation with the statement of accounts, to value its brand and disclose this information with the balance sheet, to distribute audited quarterly reports to all investors, to guarantee publication of audited annual balance sheets very soon after the close of the fiscal year (typically by April 15 for a March 31 year-end), to provide the audited balance sheet in soft copy format (floppy disks and CD-ROM) to investors and to make the balance sheet available on the internet. These reporting practices put Infosys at the leading edge of Indian practice in terms of financial reporting and disclosure.
Management Compensation
Infosys was one of the first companies to offer stock options to all qualified employees (Kuemmerle & Coughlin, 2000) . The intention was to provide appropriate incentives for the employees to create shareholder value, and to share a part of the value created with the employees. Pay-for-performance was not adopted widely in India at this time.
14 In fact, Indian regulations prohibited companies from distributing employee stock options. Infosys and the rest of the software industry, therefore, broke new ground in this respect by lobbying the government to change the regulations.
14 Note that Wipro had a stock ownership plan for senior employees dating back to the mid 1980s.
Board Structure and Practices
Infosys did not play as leading a role in ensuring a board that was comprised of independent directors, but was quick to remedy this deficiency soon after the adoption of other corporate governance practices. Currently, the company's board consists of several outsiders, including several international experts, and its practices for evaluating the performance of board members are considered cutting-edge.
However, the adoption of these various practices were symptoms of a more resilient underlying attitude that is worth noting. Infosys developed an unusual reputation for probity, honesty and transparency in all its dealings. Our interviews revealed several illustrative examples, three of which are described briefly below (in chronological order).
(1) "In 1984, when the company was working for Borland, it was importing software from the U.S. At the time you had to pay customs duties on the software (150%).
Some companies creatively interpreted the law. To get around it companies would sell books (there was no duty on books) and manuals with floppies. If you had software that was worth $60, they would say that the charge of the software was $10 but the book to go with it was $50. So they were able to avoid the duty and achieve higher margins. Infosys refused to do this, and said they would rather sell the software at half-price (lower margins) than try to circumvent the law."
(2) "In 1992 Infosys gave a fixed price bid to a company. The fixed price was based on assumptions about the time and people it would take, etcetera. After a short while on the project Infosys realized it had vastly underestimated what the cost/time requirement would be. They had two choices: 1) to try to change the contract or 2) to honor the contract. The law would have permitted some room for Infosys to back out, but they didn't. They put more people on the project and honored the contract.
'Corporate governance is about honoring your commitments; to your customers, your employees, your investors.'" (3) "Infosys collected a lot of money through its public offering in the early 1990s. It was waiting for the government to give it clearance to invest that money in a subsidiary in the U.S. While it was waiting, several board members suggested that the money, instead of sitting in the bank, should be invested in Indian stocks. Infosys lost quite a bit of money in the ensuing transaction. We consider these in turn.
(A) Lack of capital market pressure
Infosys executives and others that we interviewed in India are quick to dismiss the idea that the corporate governance practices at Infosys were adopted to attract capital.
Thus, Jayanth Verma, a member of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, stated to us, "The industry that probably needs capital the least, went after the international capital markets most aggressively…. In fact many of these companies don't know what to do with the capital they raised. .. The 15 It is prudent to point out the possibility of reverse causality in our reasoning regarding why Infosys adopted good corporate governance practices. While we reason that good corporate governance yielded factor market advantages that helped Infosys succeed, it could be that Infosys succeeded for reasons unrelated to corporate governance, and subsequently chose to invest available resources in adopting new practices. At a minimum, given the talent that flocks to Infosys in the domestic Indian labor markets, it is implausible, in our opinion, that this reverse causality captures reality entirely.
pressures that the capital markets can put on a company that doesn't need to raise capital are next to nothing."
In this regard, it is also worth noting that many of the practices for which Infosys is lauded were adopted by the company far in advance of its NASDAQ listing and, indeed, in advance of its listing on the Bombay Stock Exchange in 1993.
Further, a high reliance on internally generated capital, and strict adherence to a zero debt policy, suggests that the stringent governance standards are unlikely to have been adopted purely to assuage the concerns of external capital providers. In contrast, the primary reason cited for adoption of the corporate governance measures is to gain credibility with customers in the rough-and-tumble of the software product market. This is especially so for a company originating in a country with a baggage of negative corporate governance. Equally important is the need to be transparent and forthcoming with talent that has truly global options. Of course, these reasons are interrelated. The talent is needed in order to be able to successfully compete in the product market. company that is as much in the throes of global product and talent competition falls short of Infosys, suggesting ultimately that there is an Infosys-specific effect, in addition to whatever effect can be attributed to the global software industry.
(B) Why Infosys rather than other software firms?
It is worth pondering why Infosys chose to adopt these corporate governance measures, while other firms, arguably comparably exposed to global competition for products and talent, did not. We consider three classes of possible, and non-mutually exclusive, explanations in sequence: unobserved heterogeneity in type; positive externalities through a variety of means; and altruism on the part of Infosys management.
(Bi) Firm Asymmetries
The possibility of (unobserved) heterogeneity among firms might suggest an answer. Specifically, it could be that Infosys was sufficiently different from other candidate software firms to make adoption most beneficial for it (or to make adoption least costly for it). Stated differently, consider a situation where there is an informational asymmetry between firms and customers or suppliers, and there is a separating equilibrium under which some firms find it worthwhile -presumably less costly -to adopt corporate governance and signal their type, while others do not (Spence, 1974; Blass and Yafeh, 2001) . Then the proportion of firms that adopt good corporate governance procedures is determined entirely by the proportion of 'good' firms in the population.
One constraint to adopting good corporate governance is immediately identifiable for several of the other now-prominent firms in the industry. Wipro, Tata Consulting Services, and Satyam are all part of broader business groups.
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As such, their ability to reengineer their corporate governance systems may well be subject to inertia of a sort that did not apply to a professionally-managed startup like Infosys.
A second mechanism can be sketched out whereby firms differ sufficiently in their type so that some find it worthwhile to adopt while others do not. Suppose that governance choices are made at the outset by firms when each could either have incurred expenditure to adopt good governance or could have foregone this investment possibility.
Suppose further that firms expect that Indian industry will upgrade over time. In its early stages, there is commodity demand and not much benefit to good corporate governance.
In later stages, demand for quality rises and benefits of good corporate governance become more apparent. In such a world, it is possible to derive asymmetric equilibria where ex ante symmetric firms make different (fixed in long run) choices -i.e .some take the proverbial 'high road' and adopt good governance and profit in later stages, while others forego good governance, and profit in earlier stages, and no firm finds it beneficial to switch given the actions of others. The difference from the signaling model earlier is that there is no uncertainty in type here, but the heterogeneity among firms is driven by long-run decisions made at the outset.
(Bii) Externalities
A second class of explanation has to do with Infosys' actions imposing positive externalities on the rest of the environment.
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However, this class of explanations must still answer the question: Was Infosys better served by being the only (or one of a small number) well-governed company in the Indian software firmament, uniquely able, in the eyes of global customers, talent and customers, to benefit from India's low cost talent 20 Business groups are collections of legally independent firms, typically diversified across a range of industries, often controlled by a single family. The firms in a group are linked by several formal and informal ties. Arguments can be made both in favor of, and against, the idea that groups would adopt better governance techniques (Khanna, 2000) . Here a possible rationalization of Infosys adopting good corporate governance, and some group affiliated software firms not doing so, is as follows. Groups had access to other sources of factor inputs and did not need to rely on external markets -hence did not feel governance pressures to the same extent.
base? Or was Infosys better served by upgrading the corporate governance systems of other firms in India? Answers to these questions depend on Infosys' ability to capture some of the benefits of these positive externalities in one of two ways. Either the externality imposed on the environment results in a lower cost of capital for Infosys or talent is easier to attract, e.g. through the diaspora community, as a result of their being a larger number of well-managed Indian software firms as potential employers.
We consider four distinct mechanisms through which these positive externalities might arise: perceptions of global customers and providers in factor markets; emergence of specialized intermediaries; resolution of uncertainty; and regulatory education.
Regarding the first of these, note the quote by Mohandas Pai, Chief Financial
Officer of Infosys (Kuemmerle and Coughlin, 2000) , We want to share all our best practices with all Indian companies and will even help them implement it. That is how you create maximum value in all of India."
But Pai went further in comments to us that implied that there is a positive externality emanating from being surrounded by well-governed entities. Thus, "You are always subject to the external environment, and if you can improve it, it will serve you well. For instance, if global capital perceives India to be a great place to invest, you're obviously going to have a greater number of investors coming to India to invest. And for that, it's not good to have just one company like Infosys that has good corporate governance standards. The whole thing changing is good for India, and obviously what is good for India, is good for us. So our goal has been to work with everybody else to make a good external environment."
Second, Infosys' adoption of good corporate governance might stimulate the development of specialized intermediaries, which, in turn, will benefit other Indian software firms. For example, analysts, having been exposed to Infosys' superior disclosure practices, might demand the same from other companies. This is especially so as analyst capabilities, normally stunted in an illiquid market, themselves develop.
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Third, one can make the argument that the benefits of corporate governance are uncertain and that, once Infosys adopted and the benefits became clear, others will become more willing to adopt. This has the flavor of models of herd behavior, such as those by Banerjee (1992) and by Bhikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), which typically rely on the revelation of some information to one party and the gradual resolution of uncertainty to drive adoption by other firms.
Finally, pressure might arise from a now-educated regulator. Thus, we were told in our interviews:
"The fact that there were companies who moved forward despite the lack of regulations, made the task of creating requirements easier for regulators. Now the regulators can say, "If some of India's leading companies can do this, so can you." Today the implication of resistance is that you have something to hide, and that is not a risk that companies are willing to take. So as a result of companies moving ahead of regulation made: resistance to change lower & demand for change higher. Both from the point of view of users of financial information and providers of 22 A similar dynamic was observed in Chile (Khanna and Wu, 1998) The new SEBI guidelines mandate changes in two broad areas. First, there are proposed amendments to the board structure. In particular, the SEBI guidelines suggest that the board have more independent directors and an audit committee. The second broad area of improvement that is mandated is improvement in the accounting standards. This is somewhat tricky, since, unlike the U.S. SEC, SEBI does not have direct oversight over the accounting industry. SEBI has thus left it up to the accounting body to set standards closer to international norms. It has also said that it would enforce some of these standards through modifications on currently lax listing requirements. Among the modifications to existing accounting practices are the following: Consolidation of accounts; Disclosing accounting results by business segment and geographic segment;
Deferred tax accounting; Related party disclosures, especially to enforce the rights of the minority shareholder.
Another area where regulatory changes played a role was in the adoption of employee stock options. Till recently, Indian laws prohibited the granting of stock options to employees, limiting companies' ability to align the incentives of employees with shareholders. The software industry was the first industry to be granted an exception to the rule, thanks in part to the lobbying efforts of the software industry association NASSCOMM. Once this practice became widespread in the software industry, other companies began facing pressure in the labor market. As a result of lobbying by these companies, the Indian government recently changed the law, making it possible for all companies to grant employee stock options. Several large companies began to adopt this practice, even though the practice is currently far from being widespread among Indian companies.
Exhibit 4 provides a schematic showing the (hypothesized) inter-relationships between some of these positive externality mechanisms.
(Biii) Altruism
Spillover benefits of the sort considered above appear to our intuition to be likely to be realized over the longer term. It is worth considering the possibility that some other (temporally) proximate factor might have induced Infosys to undertake the costs of engaging in corporate governance reform even though it realized that other (possibly competing) firms might free-ride off its efforts.
A candidate factor is suggested by Murthy's ideology, much discussed in the media, perhaps partly because his famously spartan lifestyle conflicts in peoples' minds with his new-found wealth. As he says, "I believe that change happens, not because of Murthy also assigns some importance to a work stint in Paris during his formative, and pre-Infosys, years. He avers that exposure to socialism in Paris convinced him that wealth creation rather than wealth distribution was the way forward (Kuemmerle and Coughlin, 2000) . Of course, the underlying interest in the well-being of others might well have enticed him to spread corporate governance regardless of the economic implications of such actions for Infosys.
We develop here a simple economic model that clarifies a possible role played by Murthy's ideology in Infosys' decision to adopt costly corporate governance mechanisms, even with the knowledge of the possible free-riding that would ensue by other firms. The model also assigns primacy to the role that Infosys and the software association played in educating the regulator regarding corporate governance.
To rule out the possibility that our model is driven by some of the factors highlighted earlier as possible causes of Infosys' adoption -such as unobserved heterogeneity among firms or the resolution of uncertainty -we specify a model in which there are (two) symmetric firms and in which outcomes are certain. The only asymmetry is that firm 1 (to be thought of as Infosys) moves first and firm 2 follows.
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Firm 1 has to decide whether to incur fixed costs of F to adopt good corporate governance practices, in which case its marginal costs fall from c to 0. Here F is an abstraction for the numerous and costly procedures that the firm must undertake to improve disclosure, and the cost of seeking independent directors and reformulating its board, etc. Similarly, c is an abstraction for the reduction in costs of seeking either capital or talent once good governance is adopted.
Subsequently, and contingent on firm 1's decision, firm 2 makes the same decision. In the final period of the game, both firms compete in quantities with the inverse demand function given by p = 1 -q 1 -q 2 , where the subscripts refer to firm identities.
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We assume c<1 to ensure interior solutions and look for pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (hereafter, SPNE) in this simple model. The analytical strategy is to first consider outcomes in the simple game, and then to sequentially modify the game to account for altruism on the part of firm 1 and learning on the part of the (unmodelled) regulator.
The game tree with payoffs for each branch is as below. The first payoff in the parentheses at each node corresponds to firm 1's payoffs and the second to firm 2's. The tree does not show the fixed costs which are incurred by the firms if they choose to implement corporate governance. We use the notation ij to represent the decisions by firms, where i є{1, 2} denotes the firm in question, and j є{y, n} corresponds to 'adopt corporate governance' and 'do not adopt corporate governance' respectively. Thus {1y, 2y} corresponds to each of firms 1 and 2 adopting corporate governance practices. We describe the equilibria and the underlying intuition here, and relegate the (elementary) proofs to the appendix. Game Tree for the Simple Model Proposition 1 (Simple Model): For F < 4c(1-c)/9, {1y, 2y} is the only pure strategy SPNE. For F in [4c(1-c)/9, 4c/9], {1y, 2n} and {1n, 2y} can each by SPNE. For F > 4c/9, {1n, 2n} is the only pure strategy SPNE.
The simple model does not admit of both firms adopting {1y, 2y} as a SPNE. The intuition is as follows. When F is small enough, relative to the benefits received which are increasing in c, it makes sense for both firms to adopt. When F is large enough, neither firm adopts. The intermediate range is more interesting. Here it makes sense for only one firm to incur the costs of adopting. This is because, once a firm adopts, it lowers its marginal costs and can produce more. Since quantities are strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geneakoplos and Klemperer, 1985) , over-production by the adopting firm induces the other to produce less. The negative externality is sufficient in this range to make it uneconomical for the other firm to incur the fixed costs of adoption.
We now consider the following modification to incorporate the idea that the first firm to adopt helps the regulator devise procedures that facilitate subsequent adoption by other firms. We model this by the simple devise of assuming that, if 1 adopts, 2 does not incur fixed costs F of adoption.
Proposition 2 (Regulator Learning): For F < 4c(1-c)/9, {1y, 2y} is the only pure strategy SPNE. For F in [4c(1-c)/9, 4c/9], {1n, 2y} is the only pure strategy SPNE. For F > 4c/9, {1n, 2n} is the only pure strategy SPNE.
The outcome turns out not to be too different from the simple model. Part of the intuition is that the first firm knows that it is facilitating the adoption of governance by the second firm. It realizes that it will not be in as good a position to recoup its fixed cost investment (as it would be if the other firm, having to incur costs F, desisted from the adoption). Consequently it is less likely to adopt in the first instance.
We then consider an alternative modification to the simple model. One way of capturing the idea of altruism on the part of firm 1 is to model firm 1's utility as driven not just by its own profits but by those of firm 2 as well. There are substantial differences in outcome relative to the simple model. Even when F is small enough, firm 1 does not adopt. It does not find it useful to incur the fixed costs twice in effect, since it derives sufficient utility from the fact that firm 2 will adopt if it does not and from the resulting profits that firm 2 earns in equilibrium. Note that even with altruism, there is no pure strategy SPNE where firm 1 and firm 2 adopt.
Finally, we consider a model with both regulator learning and altruism. Firm 1's utility is given, as before, by the sum of profits of firms 1 and 2, and firm 2 incurs no fixed costs of adoption if firm 1 has adopted before it.
Proposition 4: (Regulator Learning and Altruism): For F < 2(2-c)/4, {1y, 2y} and {1n, 2y} are pure strategy SPNE. For F > 2(2-c)/4, {1n, 2n} is the only pure strategy SPNE.
This set of assumptions yields the broadest range of values of F for which {1y, 2y} is a pure strategy SPNE. Relative to the regulator learning without altruism model, the intuition here is that the first firm internalizes the negative externality imposed by the second firm's adoption on itself. Altruism thus induces it to adopt even though its own profits will be reduced by firm 2's adoption. 26 Such an objective function for Infosys is implicitly motivated by two assumptions -first, that Murthy derives some utility from such altruism, and, second, that he exercises sufficient influence on the firm for this to be modeled as affecting the firm's objective function. Public information suggests that each of these assumptions is not without foundation. Economists have not made much progress on modeling altruism, though see Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for a recent related attempt. The model helps us demonstrate a logically consistent set of assumptions under which both firm 1, Infosys, will adopt corporate governance and will take steps that facilitate firm 2's adoption of similar practices. Our interpretation is that, indeed, it is the interplay between altruism and regulatory learning that provides an important part of the answer to the two questions posed at the beginning on this section.
VII. The limits of globalization in causing convergence in corporate governance
Our focus on the Indian software industry, and on Infosys in particular, runs the risk of overestimating the likely effect of globalization on convergence in corporate governance. However, there are a few pieces of evidence that we can present that suggest that globalization, whether of the product, talent or capital markets, has limited effects on the corporate governance convergence in the aggregate.
The first is based on the observation that there is wide variation, even within the Indian software industry, of the extent to which various firms are regarded as wellgoverned. Some of this was previewed in the comparison between Infosys and Wipro, the latter regarded as a leading software firm. But even this comparison understates the differences since there are many software firms in India that are regarded as poorly governed. Some summary data from CLSA, which we alluded to earlier, corroborates this impressionistic statement. While Infosys and Wipro have ratings of 93.3 and 80.2 respectively, out of a possible maximum of 100, other software firms fare considerably worse, with the lowest rating (among Indian software firms) of 40.2 given to Silverline.
Indeed, the standard deviation of the corporate governance ratings is much higher for the software industry than for other industries for which we have similar numbers of observations (Biotechnology & Drugs and Commercial Banks, for example).
Larger sample econometric work also points to the same conclusion. In companion work using several datasets on corporate governance indicators around the world (including the Credit Lyonnais data alluded to above), we find little evidence of positive correlation between exposure to either global product or global capital markets and adoption by large firms of U.S.-style shareholder governance practices. We do find that exposure to global talent markets is positively (and statistically significantly) correlated with the adoption of such practices, though the effect is rather small. We also conduct a simple exercise where we ask how much of the variation in corporate governance indicators is explained by industry effects versus country effects. The overwhelming conclusion, robust across all datasets, is that country effects explain far more of the variation than do industry effects. If we accept the plausible assumption that globalization is likely to occur along industry lines, it follows that there is not much convergence in either form or function. 27 Finally, there are numerous anecdotal examples of circumstances wherein firms that were exposed to global product markets have not adopted U.S. style governance measures. Japanese and Korean firms in their heyday are examples of this phenomenon. 28 We therefore devote the remainder of this section to outlining several factors that might prevent convergence in corporate governance occurring as a result of exposure to global competition. The first of these is to note that the 'signaling of quality' story presented earlier itself suggests some limit to convergence. Poor quality firms will simply not find it worthwhile to adopt good corporate governance in a separating equilibrium A second factor is to note the possibility that there are, in fact, limited spillover effects between the software industry and the domestic economy. argue, for instance, that the software industry is a well-functioning island in an otherwise inefficient sea. Indeed, the Indian software industry is efficient partly because it is insulated from other industries and more connected to the global economy. Thus, unless a firm in some other industry is directly exposed to global competition, there will be limited influence of globalization through the software industry channel.
Third, globalization might not be strong enough to overcome vested interests' ability to block change. For example, incumbent, often family-owned and controlled, companies may perceive it to be in their (explicit or implicit) interest to block the development of markets. It might be of explicit interest if, for example, their advantage is based on preferential access to local factors, including political patronage (Olson, 1965; Fisman 2001) . It may be of implicit interest if, for example, their very refusal to adopt good corporate governance is strong enough to retard market development, an example of the path-dependence discussed by Bebchuk and Roe (1999) . For a possible way in which this might happen consider that the equity of old, family-owned companies 28 We are grateful to Fred Hu of Goldman Sachs Asia for this observation.
does not generally trade. So there is only limited reason for the quality and depth of financial intermediation to improve over time. This further reinforces the costs of raising external capital, which, in turn, ensures that family control persists. 29 Finally, it may be that U.S. style corporate governance is less applicable to emerging markets. We develop this idea briefly in the next few paragraphs. Consider that modern conventional wisdom suggests that maximizing returns to shareholders is the most sensible role for corporate governance. The usual reasoning is that shareholders are uniquely deserving of protection because other stakeholders, notably labor, have the means to protect themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Departures from this point of view effectively maintain that shareholders can impose negative externalities on other stakeholders and the latter do not necessarily have the means to protect themselves. 30 Tirole (2001) captures this conflict by describing the stakeholder view of corporate governance as encompassing both the idea that management should maximize the sum (utilitarian view) of utilities of all stakeholders, and the idea that there might be divided control -that is, divided between shareholders and other stakeholders.
How should this discussion be modified to suit the realities of an emerging market like India? First, the idea that labor can protect itself against expropriation by shareholders is less plausible in such a country for several reasons. The prospect of controlling shareholders reaping private benefits from companies that they control is vast.
Further, the court system does not function well enough to check this. Finally, the absence of smoothly functioning markets for human capital imply that exploited talent cannot simply vote with its feet in the face of shareholder-induced adversity. For all these reasons, a plausible case can be made that corporate governance should be sensitive to the interests of more than just shareholders.
Further, another usual argument -that of tractability -that usually operates in favor of shareholder based governance is weaker in emerging markets. Tirole (2001) argues, for example, that one cannot divine explicit incentives for managers which are based on some observable and readily measurable measure of aggregate welfare of stakeholders. The value of various relationships that the firm engages in are not generally observable on well-functioning markets, whereas relationships with shareholders generally are. However, this last statement -having to do with the ease of devising a metric of welfare of shareholders -is less true in poorly functioning capital markets in emerging economies. Ceteris paribus, this tilts us more to the side of stakeholder governance in much of corporate India than it would it an economy with well-functioning capital markets.
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Software may be an exception to this reasoning partly because the global talent markets imply that labor does have the option to vote with its feet, as it were, if its wages are unsatisfactory. SEBI member Verma explains, "The software industry was uniquely positioned because it interacted with a very large number of stakeholders who were accustomed to higher standards of transparency; not just investors but customers and even in many ways their employees. The employees were knowledge workers who were more demanding and a much higher percentage of employees who had a choice of where to go. The typical type of industrial worker probably does not have the same kind of mobility both within the country and outside, as the knowledge worker does. The balance of power in the software industry (or in a knowledge industry) is far less heavily loaded in favor of the organization as it is in the traditional industries. This is true 31 Berglof and von Thadden (1999) also argue that corporate governance in developing countries should reflect broader considerations than simply shareholder value maximization. Of course, this does not undercut the observation that designing corporate governance systems that respond to stakeholder welfare is indeed hard. Tirole (2001) suggests that the best one might do in some circumstances is to hire an idealist, uniquely motivated to be honest. Indeed, Murthy appears to be just such a man. of the customer base as well. When you are selling services to the global Fortune 500, they obviously have their choice of sources/service providers from all around the world."
Further the power of talent may not be confined just to the software industry. Kapur and Ramamurti (2001: page 10) say that there are other Indian industries where global competition endows talent with power -they include media, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and industries like accounting services and credit card processing, medical transcriptions, and call-centers. Bhuvenesh Singh, analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston, suggested that "SEBI was a bigger catalyst in terms of governance standards for companies outside of the IT sector." The implication is that Infosys' governance practices might naturally, or with Murthy's help, have spread within the information technology sector. However, global forces were insufficient, in and of themselves, to ensure good corporate governance in other sectors in the economy. For this purpose, the analyst opined that the regulators needed to be co-opted for diffusion to occur. The argument, then, is that the sort of shareholder centered governance brought to India by Infosys will be applicable in some sectors exposed to global competition, but probably not more broadly to other parts of the economy.
Indeed, Indian regulators have struggled with this issue. The Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate Governance has the following to say regarding the stakeholder versus shareholder-centric view of corporate governance. The committee's objective (Item 2.6) was to devise a code that could draw on the work done by international bodies that preceded it but to prepare a code to "suit the Indian corporate environment, as corporate governance frameworks are not exportable." view the interests of other stakeholders.'" This is consistent with the idea that shareholder-style governance may have some, but not universal, applicability in India's emerging market setting.
VIII. Conclusion
Does product and labor market globalization cause convergence in corporate governance? Our case analysis suggests that the answer to this question is a 'constrained yes.' A summary of our interpretation of the case follows.
Software firms', and especially Infosys', exposure to global product markets, first, and then to global talent markets, seems to have driven some adoption of shareholderstyle corporate governance in India. In contrast to the stance taken by the existing literature on the convergence of corporate governance, we do not find much of a role for capital markets as drivers of this process. If anything, Infosys and some other Indian software firms accessed global capital markets long after their exposure to global product and global talent markets had driven them to adopt good corporate governance practices.
Infosys may have chosen to be a lead adopter of such practices in India for several reasons that we analyze -as a signal of its high quality, to benefit indirectly from positive externalities that its adoption decision had on other software firms in India, or as a consequence of Infosys' CEO's ideological bent. We discuss how this latter reason results in a pro-active role taken by a coalition of firms in 'educating the regulators' in how good corporate governance should be adopted. However, the Infosys success story and its efforts at regulatory education notwithstanding, there is only limited diffusion of such practices to other firms in the software industry and to other firms in India. We explore several reasons why, in practice, the effects of globalization on corporate governance convergence are somewhat limited.
It is possible that the effects of adoption decisions taken by Infosys, by other leading software firms, and by other leading firms in global industries in India, are only just beginning to be felt. 33 Perhaps the conclusion of limited diffusion (along the lines sketched out in Exhibit 4) is premature. In ongoing work, we are hand-collecting large sample data to shed light on both a positive and a normative question. The positive question has to do with quantifying various barriers to the diffusion of U.S. style corporate governance. The normative question has to do with the extent to which such practices should diffuse in the emerging market context of India. 33 Note also that perhaps the bigger and longer-term effect that Narayan Murthy's stance and actions will have on the Indian private sector is through his, perhaps inadvertently assumed, role as an exemplar of entrepreneurship in an economy where cynicism about business ineffectiveness and bureaucratic strangleholds were rife. We do not develop this notion here further, as it is somewhat outside this paper's purview. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Altruism):
Here the payoffs on the nodes of the game tree must be modified for the different objective function of firm 1. Firm 1 maximizes π 1 = (1-q 1 -q 2 -c 1 )q 1 + (1-q 1 -q 2 -c 2 )q 2 while firm 2 continues to maximize π 2 = (1-q 1 -q 2 -c 2 )q 2. The tree below shows the equilibrium payoffs for each node. 
